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Abstract1 
Peru has one of the highest informality rates in Latin America, with almost 60 
percent of the urban labor force working at the margins of labor market legislation 
or in microenterprises that lack basic labor market standards (Marcouiller, Ruiz de 
Castilla, and Woodruff, 1997). This paper identifies two factors that can explain 
the variation in informality rates in the 1990s. First, Peru experienced a steady 
increase in employment allocation in traditionally “informal” sectors—in  
particular, retail trade and transport. Second,  there was a sharp increase in non-
wage labor costs, despite a reduction in the average productivity of the economy. 
In addition, the paper illustrates the negative correlation between productivity and 
informality by evaluating the impacts of the PROJOVEN youth training program. 
                                                          
1 Alberto Chong: albertoch@iadb.org; José Galdo: galdojo@mcmaster.ca; Jaime Saavedra: 
jsaavedra@worldbank.org. The views and opinions in this paper should not be attributed to the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the World Bank, or their Executive Directors. The standard disclaimer applies. 
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1. Introduction 
A unique aspect of the analysis of labor markets in developing countries is the impact of the 
informal sector on the structure and dynamics of employment and earnings. Peru in particular 
has one of the highest informality rates in the region, with almost 60 percent of the urban labor 
force working at the margins of labor market legislation or in microenterprises that lack basic 
labor market standards (Marcouiller, Ruiz de Castilla, and Woodruff, 1997).  
Peru is one of several Latin American countries that drastically changed its labor market 
institutions during the 1990s as part of a process of reducing the role of the state in determining 
relative prices and the allocation of resources. A new employment law, enacted in 1991, called 
for radical measures to eliminate labor-market rigidities. In practice, the elimination of both job-
stability laws and cumbersome dismissal procedures, along with the introduction of flexible 
contracting mechanisms, made Peru’s legislation one of the most flexible in the region (Cox 
Edwards, 1997; Lora and Pagés, 1996).  
A standard prediction is that the deregulation of the labor market would increase the 
benefits of staying in the formal sector and would also increase the relative costs of entering or 
staying in the informal sector, mainly because of the reduction in hiring and dismissal costs in 
the formal sector of the economy. What the data show, however, is not only that has Peru 
maintained one of the highest informality rates in the region, but also that the share of informal 
employment has grown consistently in the last 15 years, regardless of the criteria used to define 
informality.  
In this paper we explore the different factors that may explain the variation in the 
informality rates. First, we analyze the evolution of informality in the labor markets between 
1986 and 2001 in terms of both income levels and growth rates and growth rates for different 
demographic groups and economic sectors. Then, we decompose the growth of informality in its 
between and within components to analyze whether changes in the informality rates are due to 
changes in labor allocation between sectors or due to variation in the proportion of informal 
employment within each sector. In fact, Peru experienced a steady increase in employment 
allocation in two key sectors: retail trade and transportation, which together explained about 55 
percent of the overall informality rate in 2000.    
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We also explore the possible role of labor legislation and non-wage labor costs. The 
sharp increase in non-wage labor costs despite a reduction in the average productivity of the 
economy is striking. By 2000, these labor costs reached 40 percent, far above the regional 
average. The magnitude of these labor costs may affect firms’ and workers’ preferences for 
demanding and offering employment in the formal labor market. Firms will be willing to incur 
these costs if they are able to transfer at least part of them to workers in the form of lower 
salaries, or if they perceive that providing the benefits will increase productivity. Similarly, 
workers will accept lower current earnings only if they value the benefits that they receive more 
than the cost they paid to cover them, which is difficult particularly for low-productivity workers 
for whom the discount rates are very high.  
Finally, we illustrate the negative relationship between productivity and informality by 
evaluating the impact of the PROJOVEN Youth Training program, which offers training to 
disadvantaged young individuals aged 16 to 24 through job-specific training in blue-collar 
occupations. PROJOVEN shows that incremental increases in individuals’ productivity lead to 
lower rates of informality. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the evolution of informality rates 
in Peru in the past 15 years and documents the extent of this problem with respect to other Latin 
American countries. Section 3 examines the impact of labor costs and sector-allocation 
employment on the growth of informality. Section 4 presents econometric estimates. Section 5 
illustrates the relationship between informality and productivity through an evaluation of the 
effect of PROJOVEN on the informal/formal outcomes for participants. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Informality in Peru: Overview 1986-2001 
One of the most distinctive features of the Peruvian labor market is the size of the informal 
sector. By 2000, the percentage of the employed labor force without access to any social benefits 
was significantly higher than in other Latin American countries. Indeed, as Table 1 reports, Latin 
America already has one of the world’s highest informality rates, just below that of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Whereas average informality in Latin America reaches 51 percent, the rate of informal 
employment in Peru reaches 60 percent. If rural areas are taken into account, informal 
employment rates at the national level enter the 70-percent range.  
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During the 1990s, Peru and several Latin American countries experienced an increasing 
trend in informality rates despite the fact that the benefits as well as the costs of formality 
increased because of macroeconomic stabilization and the flexibilization of labor legislation. As 
Figure 1 indicates, the share of jobs in the informal sector clearly increased in Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Chile was the only exception. In addition, the 
percentage of wage earners without any access to social security—either health or pension 
benefits—increased in most countries, with the exception of Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay.  
This increasing trend in the share of informal jobs is steeper in the case of Peru. Figure 2 
shows a steady increase in the rate of informality from the late 1980s—regardless of how one 
defines informality. Whether using a “legal” definition  (workers who do not receive social 
security coverage or pay social security taxes as a condition of employment) or a “traditional” 
one (workers who operate or are employed in firms with five or fewer employers, 
nonprofessional self-employed persons, and domestic and unpaid family workers) the share of 
informal jobs significantly increased by about 10 percentage points between 1996 and 2000. 
Furthermore, the Peruvian data show a weak correlation between economic growth and 
informality rates as shown by the lack of any countercyclical pattern in the informality rates 
profiles. This suggests that increments in the average productivity of the economy do not 
translate into more high-productivity jobs despite the rate of labor-force participation (LFP) 
having behaved pro-cyclically with respect to the GDP during the period of analysis.2 
Changes in the share of informal jobs do not affect every worker or every sector to the 
same degree. For instance, the empirical literature suggests that job-security provisions, a 
potential determinant of informality, decrease the employment prospects of young, female, and 
unskilled workers (Heckman and Pagés, 2001). Thus, the identification of “winners” and 
“losers” is informative because it allows for a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the 
changes in the share of informal employment. In fact, the data reveal substantial heterogeneity in 
the growth of informality across gender, age, schooling, and sector of economic activity in the 
past 15 years.     
Figure 3 reports the informality rates for males and females between 1986 and 2001. 
Using the “legal” definition, we observe a sharp inequality in the informality rates across gender 
                                                          
2 In the period of economic downturn between 1986 and 1992, the GDP fell at a rate of 3.9 percent per year while 
the LFP declined at a rate of 1.0 percent per year. In the period of economic recovery from 1992 to 1997, the GDP 
grew at an annual average rate of 7.2 percent and the LFP grew by 2.3 percent per year. 
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during the 1980s. The difference in the informality rates between males and females reached 
almost 20 percentage points in 1986 (47 versus 65 percent). Interestingly, this large inequality in 
the labor market disappeared during the 1990s, with the share of informal employment in 2001 
being the same for males and females. One potential explanation for this closing gap would be 
the increasing levels of schooling attained by the female population, which may serve to increase 
the number of females in high-productivity jobs. A more detailed analysis of the data, however, 
shows a different story. The seemingly decreasing inequality gap was fundamentally driven by 
large increases in male informality rates rather than by reductions in female ones. In fact, the rate 
of informality for males rose from 47 to 61 percent between 1996 and 2001. For the same period, 
the female rate of informality decreased by about 5 percentage points (65 to 60 percent). 
We observe somewhat similar patters using the “traditional” criterion. Whereas the share 
of informal employment increased by 18 percentage points for males between 1986 and 2001, 
females showed a modest increase of only 3 percentage points for the same reference period. 
Unlike the “legal” criterion, the “traditional” one still shows a modest but positive gap in the 
informality rates between males and females in the early 2000s, which sharply decreased from 
24 percentage points in 1986 to 9 percentage points in 2001.  
Figure 4 presents informality profiles across different age groups. In particular, three 
cohorts of individuals are considered: young workers (16-24 years of age), prime-age workers 
(25-45 years), and senior workers (46+ years). Using the “legal” definition of informality, three 
patterns emerge. First, young workers are more likely to be in the informal sector. Their average 
informality rate for the period of analysis was 20 percentage points above the rate for prime-age 
workers (70 versus 50 percent). This feature is not surprising given the large literature that 
documents particularly poor labor-market outcomes for young workers (Marcouiller, Ruiz de 
Castilla, and Woodruff, 1997; Nickell, 1997; Addison and Texeira, 2001; Montenegro and 
Pagés, 2003).  
Second, all age groups exhibited an upward trend in the share of informal employment in 
the past 15 years. However, the growth of informality was not similar across age groups. Prime-
age and senior workers exhibited steeper growth in informality rates. In fact, between 1986 and 
2001, both prime-age and older workers experienced an increase of about 10 percentage points in 
the share of informal employment, whereas the youngsters reported an increase of half that. 
These asymmetric tendencies are even more pronounced if the analysis is based on the 
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“traditional” approach. Here older workers (46+) showed higher levels of informality than 
younger workers in the early 2000s, while the gap between younger and prime-age workers 
almost disappeared.     
Thus, it seems that the increase in the average informality of the Peruvian labor market is 
more related to the evolution of informality among prime-age and older workers rather than to 
the performance of younger workers. The older workers lost inefficient but high-quality jobs as 
part of the new orientation of the economy in the 1990s. Profits fell in many oligopolistic sectors, 
and soft-budget-constraint public enterprises and institutions disappeared or were downsized. As 
such, sectors that were inefficient but that maintained high-quality jobs financed by those rents 
shrank or disappeared, and many formal-sector wage jobs were lost as part of the process. 
Indeed, the deregulation of the labor market allowed firms to replace expensive older workers 
with more educated younger workers willing to accept lower wages. 
Figure 5 shows large differences in the share of informal employment across levels of 
schooling. Four educational groups were used: less than or equal to 6 years of primary school; 
secondary school (7 to 12 years of schooling); non-university postsecondary education; and 
university education. In general, there is a negative correlation between informality and 
schooling attainment, which is a standard finding in the literature (see Saavedra and Chong, 
1999). More interesting patterns emerge when we analyze the evolution of informality across 
these educational groups in the past 15 years. The data reveal that the changes in the orientation 
of the economy have largely favored individuals with university education. Under the “legal” 
criterion, we observe a sharp decline in the rates of informality for this group starting in 1994, 
which is consistent with the patterns of the returns to education in Peru (see Saavedra, 1997; 
Díaz, 1999.)3  
On the other hand, informality among individuals with primary and secondary education 
has notably increased by 8 and 12 percentage points in the past 15 years, respectively, which 
may explain the large drop in relative earnings for these two groups during the mid-1990s. 
Interestingly, the highest increase in the share of informal employment is among individuals with 
post-secondary non-university education. This educational group, whose labor outcomes were 
                                                          
3 According to Saavedra (1997) and Díaz (1999), the upward trends in relative earnings for the more skilled workers 
between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s can be explained by an increase in the relative demand that was biased 
toward women and high-skilled workers, which more than compensated for the increase in the relative supply of 
these groups. 
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comparable or even better than individuals with university education in the 1980s, experienced 
the largest increase in informality during the 1990s. In fact, under the “legal” criterion, 
informality increased by more than 15 percentage points between 1986 and 2001. Using the 
“traditional” criterion, the informality growth for this group reached 20 percentage points.     
3. Understanding Informality Growth 
3.1 Institutional Reforms and Non-Wage Labor Costs 
Peru is one of several Latin American countries that substantially reduced labor-market rigidities 
in the 1990s in the course of reducing the state’s role in determining relative prices and the 
allocation of resources (see Saavedra and Maruyama, 2000; and Saavedra and Chong, 1999, for 
an extensive analysis of the labor reforms). The deregulation of labor institutions, mainly the 
consequence of the Ley de Fomento del Empleo No. 728,  included a new array of fixed-term and 
atypical contract regimes such as subcontracting through employment cooperatives and flexible 
training contracts for younger workers. It also raised the probationary period for employment 
from three months to between six and 12 months, simplified previous cumbersome dismissal 
procedures, and allowed firms to lay off workers when downsizing was required.  
In addition, the Peruvian labor market was also deregulated as the capability and 
willingness of the authorities to enforce regulations decreased. The budget for inspections fell 
dramatically, so inspections were usually limited to large firms. Also, there was a change in the 
behavior of labor courts, which became much less pro-labor than before. Union bargaining 
power also fell dramatically, partly due to changes in labor legislation such as imposing fewer 
restrictions on organizing unions in small firms, allowing more than one union within a firm, 
decentralizing the collective bargaining process, and reducing red tape in the use of temporary 
contracts.4  
Both theory and applied work suggest there is a strong relationship between rigidities in 
labor institutions and the performance of labor markets (Lazear, 1990; Djankov et al., 2002; 
Heckman and Pagés, 2001). In particular, it is expected that the deregulation of labor-market 
institutions—accompanied by a healthy macroeconomic recovery and the simplification of tax 
rules and administrative procedures—would increase both the benefits of formality and the costs 
                                                          
4 By law, temporary workers may belong to a union, but firms implicitly threatened workers who registered in a 
union by not renewing the contract. 
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of entering or staying in the informal sector.5 As shown by Saavedra and Torero (2003), high 
expected severance payments have a negative impact on formal labor demand, so this labor-
market flexibilization should have led to an increase in the proportion of formality among wage 
earners. 
The evolution of the informality profile, however, exhibited a different pattern during the 
1990s. One explanation for part of the variation in the share of informal employment is the 
erratic behavior of certain labor costs, which increased sharply despite a fall in the average 
productivity of the economy. In particular, the gap between the gross wages paid by employers 
and the net wages received by the workers in the formal sector, known as non-wage labor costs, 
sharply increased in the last decade. By 1998, Peru had the highest non-wage labor costs among 
a sample of Latin American countries, exceeding Chile by 27 percentage points and Mexico and 
Argentina by 20 percentage points (Tokman and Martinez, 1999).  
Figure 6 shows the evolution of non-wage labor costs between 1987 and 2002. We 
observe that the non-wage labor costs paid by workers increased from 3.5 percent in 1987 to 
almost 12 percent in 2002, whereas the employer share increased from 42 to 47 percent for the 
same period. These increments were not smooth, but erratic and contradictory during the period 
of analysis. For instance, the non-wage labor costs paid by workers increased from 4 percent in 
December 1992 to 25 percent in January 1993, fell to 20 percent in December 1993, and then fell 
again to around 11 percent in August 1995. Likewise, employer contributions vary even more 
erratically: they increased from 43 percent in December 1988 to 47 in May 1990 to 55 percent in 
May 1991, then fell to 41 percent in January 1993, rose again to 47 percent in November 1993, 
increased to 53 percent in August 1995, and finally fell to 47 percent in September 2001.  
In this context, a firm thinking about creating a formal job must take into account specific 
labor costs: taxes, non-wage costs, and administrative procedures. The firm will be willing to 
incur these costs if it is able to transfer at least part of them to workers in the form of lower 
salaries, or if it perceives that providing the benefits will increase productivity. A firm might not 
be able to pass these costs on to workers if the labor market is tight, if there is a minimum wage, 
or if workers do not value the resulting benefits. Therefore, it is not unusual for small firms to 
                                                          
5 Deep institutional changes in the tax-collection system were implemented in 1991, and were aimed at modernizing 
and strengthening the institution. The tax code was streamlined, with a reduction in the number and dispersion of 
rates and a reduction of exemptions and loopholes. As a consequence, the number of contributors—both individuals 
and firms—increased steadily, as did the ratio of taxes to GDP. 
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opt for informal employment relationships, both because their productivity is too low to be able 
to finance the mandated social benefits and because workers in the relevant market are not 
willing to receive lower salaries to cover these costs. It is also possible that successive and 
disorganized changes in labor-market legislation affected the confidence of large firms as well, 
leading them to demand employment without the social benefits mandated by law.6 By 2000, 
only 33 percent of private wage earners received mandatory health and pension benefits, far 
behind most countries in the region.  
From the workers’ point of view, it is plausible to expect that the dramatic changes in 
their contributions to the non-wage labor costs affected their valuation of the benefits and costs 
of working in the formal sector, particularly for workers in the bottom quintiles of the earnings 
distribution, who prefer current rather than future consumption. In 2001, of every S/1,000 soles 
paid by the employer as gross wages, only about S/600 soles ended up in the worker’s pocket, 
representing a 40 percent non-wage labor cost. It is likely that some workers do not value the 40 
percent of their salary in benefits that they would receive (such as CTS, health benefits) and 
would prefer to stay in or move to the informal sector on the basis of cost-benefit evaluations. 
For instance, the willingness to save for an old-age pension is low because these workers view 
all or part of these payments as taxes. Something similar applies to health benefits, in which 
these workers prefer to run the risk of not receiving medical care rather than paying the health 
premiums.    
Yamada (1996) and Saavedra and Chong (1999), for instance, document that a large 
percentage of urban self-employed individuals decide voluntarily to work in the informal sector 
because the earnings they receive are superior to the earnings they would obtain had they worked 
in the formal sector.7 This finding is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis that suggests 
that individuals rationally choose to be in the informal sector based on the valuation of the 
earnings they would make in the formal and informal sectors, their preferences, the constraints 
they face given their endowment of human capital, and the level of formal-sector labor 
productivity in the country (Maloney, 1999).  
                                                          
6 One illustrative example about the ambiguous way in which the laws were changed is the evolution of the 
contribution to FONAVI: the law changed seven times between 1988 and 1997.  
7 It does not mean that informal workers are not living in poverty, only that they would not be better off in the 
formal sector given their endowment of human capital.  
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In summary, the costs of formality are still too high compared with the perceived value of 
the benefits, given productivity. If a formal job comes with benefits that the workers do not 
value, or that the firm’s productivity is not high enough to pay for, then formal jobs will not be 
created. If benefits such as vacations and dismissal costs are too generous given productivity 
levels, only a small number of workers will end up enjoying them. As long as workers are not 
willing to accept lower wages to pay for fringe benefits, or firms are not willing and able to 
finance them, they will find ways to avoid paying such benefits.  
3.2  Changes in the Productive Matrix  
The process of job creation and job destruction has been particularly vigorous in Peru during the 
past 20 years because of the macroeconomic volatility of the 1980s and the turbulent structural 
reforms of the 1990s. This has had a direct impact on the evolution of informality because the 
process of job creation can accelerate employment allocation in some traditional “informal” 
sectors. For instance, between 1992 and 1998, employment grew at a rate of 5.3 percent per year; 
mainly concentrated in retail trade, transportation, and financial and business services. As 
depicted in Table 2, the allocation of employment in these three sectors increased by 12 percent 
between 1986 and 2001, while employment dropped in manufacturing and public-sector 
employment for the same period.  
We decomposed changes in informality between and within sectors to measure whether 
changes in informality have been induced by reallocation of employment in traditional informal 
sectors or changes in the informality within each sector. Let L denotes total employment, jL  
employment in the sector j, and jL%  informal employment in the sector j where j=1,…,J. The 
informality rate can be represented 
1
J jL
jL j
L
a
L=
= ∑%
%
       (1) 
where jj
L
a
L
=  represents the share of employment in the j sector. Thus, changes in the 
informality rate between period t and t+1 can be expressed as  
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where the first term in brackets represents the within effects, the second term the between 
effects, andε  is a residual term representing the interaction of the within and between effects. 
The within effects measure changes in the share of the informal employment rate due to 
variations in the proportion of informal employment within each sector, fixing the proportion of 
total employment allocated in each category. In the same way, the between effects measure 
changes in the share of informal employment due to changes in labor allocations between 
sectors, fixing informality rates in each sector.  
We consider four different year combinations: 1995–1987, 1995–1989, 2000–1987 and 
2000-1989, which allows us to compare the evolution of both within and between effects before 
and after the structural reforms, with each year combination corresponding to different economic 
states (growth/growth, growth/recession, recession/growth, and recession/recession), and 
different time spans to control for potential effects of the economic cycle.  
Four basic patterns emerge from Table 3. First, the aggregated within and between effects 
are positive for all year combinations, reflecting a positive upward trend in informality rates 
independent of the economic cycle. Second, three economic sectors emerge as net contributors to 
informality growth in all time periods: (i) retail trade, restaurant, and hotels, (ii) transport and 
communications, and (iii) finance, insurance, and business. In particular, the retail trade, 
restaurant, and hotels sector is the largest contributor to the growth of informality in all periods. 
Third, a careful analysis of each of these three sectors reveals that the between effects tend to 
dominate the within ones. Put differently, the growth in informal employment is fundamentally 
due to the growth of labor allocation in these traditionally informal sectors and is to a lesser 
extent due to the growth of informality within these sectors. Fourth, manufacturing, construction, 
and other services are weak contributors to the informality growth fundamentally because of the 
decrease in the allocation of labor in these sectors. Thus, the observed growth in informality in 
these economic sectors is basically driven by the within component. In particular, the 
manufacturing sector, which traditionally has been considered a “formal” sector, has 
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simultaneously decreased its participation in the share of total employment and increased its 
share of informal employment. The drop in manufacturing employment is explained in part by 
the disappearance of many manufacturing industries and the transformation of others into firms 
that import the products they had produced before the trade liberalization of the early 1990s.  
In summary, the observed upward trend in the rate of informality in the Peruvian labor 
market in the past 15 years may be explained by a perverse combination of increasing labor 
allocation in traditionally informal sectors (such as retail trade) and decreasing labor allocation in 
traditionally formal sectors (such as manufacturing), along with growth in informal employment 
within all economic sectors. The emerging new productive matrix seems to be the result of 
structural changes in the orientation of the economy triggered by simultaneous trade 
liberalization, fiscal reform, deregulation of the goods markets, extensive privatization processes, 
and labor market reforms, which generated an increase in productivity that was concentrated in 
just a few specific sectors where new employment creation was meager. In the rest of the 
economy, there was employment creation but in low-productivity jobs.      
4. Econometric Analysis 
In this section we empirically model the selection into the formal/informal sectors. We estimate 
maximum likelihood probit models for three different samples: 1986–1991 (before the reforms), 
1991–2001 (after the reforms), and the full sample set using the Annual Household Surveys 
(ENAHO) for Metropolitan Lima. We posit the following model for the individual “i” in year 
“j”:  
1Pr( 1) ( , , )ij ij ij jI f X S NWLC −= =   (3) 
where ijI  is an indicator variable that takes 1 if the individual i in year j works in the informal 
sector, Xij is a set of control covariates including variables related to human capital (education, 
training and experience), and variables that may determine the preferences and tastes of workers 
(gender, marital status, and age). ijS is a set of dummy variables for economic sectors. 1jNWLC −  
are the annual average non-wage labor costs that varies across time but not across individuals. 
The shares of both firms and workers are lagged one period and are included separately. Because 
we do not observe much variation in the non-wage labor costs before the reforms, we include 
them only when estimating the full sample.  
 15
Table 4 reports marginal effects and its respective standard errors for two different 
operational definitions (legal and traditional) of the informal sector. Independently of the 
criterion used, we observe a strong relationship between variables related to human-capital and 
formality before and after the reforms. Education significantly reduces the likelihood of being 
informal. Overall it is clear that workers with more human capital are more likely to be able to 
afford to pay for the benefits associated with formality.  
The most interesting results, however, are the profiles of individuals with university and 
non-university tertiary education. Having a university education reduces the probability of being 
in the informal sector by 20 percent before the reforms. It increases in absolute value to 28 
percent after the labor reforms. On the other had, having non-university tertiary education 
reduces the likelihood of being in the informal sector by 25 percent before the reforms, but 
decreases in absolute value to 24 percent after the reforms. It is noteworthy that these education-
informality profiles follow patterns similar to those observed in the returns to education in the 
1990s that showed an increase in the market value of a college degree and a reduction in the 
market value of non-university tertiary education following Peru’s structural reforms (Saavedra, 
1997). Using the “traditional” criterion does not change these patterns, although somewhat 
different point estimates are generated.  
Similarly, the likelihood of being in the informal sector decreases with training, 
independently of the definition used. There is a huge gap, however, depending on the type of 
training received. On average, workers receiving on-the-job training reduce their probability of 
being in the informal sector by 14 and 27 percent before and after the reforms, respectively. On 
the other hand, workers receiving outside training reduce this probability by only 4 and 8 
percent, respectively. In both cases, it is interesting to note that the value of the training 
significantly increased after the deregulation of the labor institutions. No qualitative changes 
occur using the “traditional” criterion. Tenure also affects the likelihood of being in the informal 
sector. On average, one extra year in the same job reduced the probability of holding an informal 
job by 2 percent before the labor reforms. The evidence suggests the value of tenure decreased 
after the reforms.   
Several demographic variables may also explain the likelihood of informality. By looking 
at the “traditional” criterion and the pooled sample, we observe that males are 7 percent less 
likely to work in the informal sector. In addition, the point estimates do not show a reduction in 
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the gender gap after the reforms, contrary to what we observe in Figure 3. Indeed, the gender-
informality relationship tends to be fuzzy in our estimation, since the “legal” definition shows 
positive but not statistically significant point estimates. To reconcile this seemingly confusing 
result, a finer approach involves modeling the selection into four different job categories—
informal wage earners, informal self-employed, formal wage earners, and formal self-
employed—using a multinomial logit model.8 The results indicate that males are less likely to 
work as informal self-employed but more likely to work as informal wage earners. Furthermore, 
the probability of working as an informal wage earner for males increased from 4 to 8 percent 
between 1986 and 1994, which explains the reduction in the gender gap experienced after the 
reforms.  
Married workers may be more willing to accept a lower wage in order to receive social 
benefits and may also be more willing to pay them themselves. There is no clear pattern, 
however, regarding the marginal effects for this variable. It depends on the informality criterion 
and the sample set used. By looking at the pooled sample, we observe that married individuals 
are less likely to work in the informal sector (-6 percentage points) under the “legal” criterion. 
On the other hand, they are more likely to work in the informal sector (5 percentage points) 
under the “traditional” approach. One plausible explanation is that being married reduces the 
likelihood of working as an informal wage earner, but it has a reverse effect on the likelihood of 
working informally as a self-employed person. In fact, the multinomial model shows that 
married workers are more likely to work as informal self-employed but less likely to work as 
informal wage earners both before and after the reforms.   
Age also increases the likelihood of formality under both the “legal” and “traditional” 
criteria. Before the reforms, one extra year increased the likelihood of working in the formal 
sector by 3 percent, whereas this number dropped to 0.7 percent after the reforms. This finding 
reveals that during the 1990s and particularly at the end of the decade, age was less important in 
determining the likelihood of working formally. This is also consistent with a reduction in the 
relative earnings of older workers, a reduction in the returns to experience, and the flat 
employment/population ratios observed for older workers reported elsewhere (Saavedra and 
Maruyama, 2000). Indeed, the implied reduction in the demand for older workers was related to 
changes in legislation and technological changes. Many older workers who lost their jobs as a 
                                                          
8 The estimates are available upon request.  
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consequence of public downsizing, privatization, and the contraction of formerly protected 
manufacturing industries were unable to find formal jobs—or any jobs at all. On the other hand, 
the introduction of technological changes as a consequence of a reduction in the relative prices of 
capital and an increase in investment in new modern service sectors due to the opening of the 
economy increased the relative demand of younger workers.   
How workers sort themselves—or are sorted—between sectors significantly affects the 
likelihood of holding informal jobs mainly because of productivity differences across sectors. 
Using the “traditional” approach, we observe that working in construction, retail trade, and 
transportation increases the probability of being informal by 20, 38, and 26 percent, respectively. 
Thus, it is clear that the growth of labor allocation in these sectors as a result of Peru’s structural 
reforms can explain an important part of the variation in the informality rates in the 1990s. 
Before the reforms, for example, working in the transportation sector was associated with a 10-
percent increase in the probability of being informal. This jumped by almost three-fold after the 
reforms. Though the point estimates using the “legal” criterion are somewhat different, the 
qualitative results do not change.      
Finally, we observe for the pooled data that variations in non-wage labor costs 
significantly affect the likelihood of working in the informal sector. Under the “traditional” 
criterion, an increase of 10 percentage points in the non-wage costs paid for the employer is 
associated with an increase of 6 percentage points in the likelihood of holding an informal job, 
whereas an increase of 10 percentage points in the non-wage costs paid for the worker is 
associated with an increase of 1 percentage point. Because we are using household data, these 
results are consistent with the idea that workers make cost-benefit evaluations as the result of 
changes in labor costs that may affect their preferences and the profitability of entering or 
staying in the informal sector. This is particularly relevant for workers with low levels of 
productivity who have less preference for social benefits because at low levels of income the 
discount rates are so high that the perceived benefits do not match the costs of giving up actual 
levels of consumption.9 It does not mean that informal workers are not living in poverty, only 
that they would not be better off in the formal sector given their current levels of productivity.  
 
                                                          
9 Jaramillo (2004), for instance, reports asymmetric distribution of social benefits by percentiles of income: as of 
2000, 10 percent of workers in the bottom quintile and 32 percent of workers in the top quintile had health benefits.  
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5. Do Increments in Productivity Lead to Less Informality? A Case Study  
During the 1990s, several countries, including Peru, launched labor-market initiatives in the form 
of training programs that sought to increase the productivity of targeted disadvantaged 
individuals who graduated from isolated public schools. An examination of the impacts of these 
types of programs allows us to evaluate whether increments in productivity are associated with 
higher levels of formality in the labor market. The implicit hypothesis is that better-educated 
individuals are more productive and therefore are more willing to pay for the benefits (such as 
health insurance and old-age pensions) associated with high-quality jobs.  
5.1 The PROJOVEN Program  
The Youth Training Program PROJOVEN was implemented in Lima in 1995 with the goal of 
increasing the employability and productivity of disadvantaged young individuals aged 16 to 24 
through job-specific training in blue-collar occupations.10 The treatment consists of a mix of 
formal and on-the-job training organized into two sequential phases. The first stage consists of 
300 hours of classes at training-center locations—roughly five hours per day for three months. In 
the second phase, the training institutions must place trainees into paid, on-the-job training in 
private manufacturing firms for an additional period of three months. 
The most distinctive element differentiating this training program from previous public-
sponsored initiatives was the decentralization of the training services through market 
mechanisms in which public and private training institutions compete for public funds (see 
Chong and Galdo, 2006). The assignment of government funds to any training institution, private 
or public, is similar in spirit to the school vouchers approach, which is motivated by the idea that 
competition will be translated into expanded access and enhanced service quality, and will 
therefore improve labor market outcomes. 
The selection of the training courses relies on bidding processes that target the relatively 
best training courses at the best competing prices. Thus, private and public training institutions 
that operate for profit compete for limited public funding following standard processes and strict 
timetables. To ensure the relevance of the training courses, the program relies on a demand-
driven mechanism that stipulates that all training centers must present, as part of their offers, 
                                                          
10 These occupations include, for example, maintenance mechanics, electricians, janitors and building cleaners, 
cashiers, receptionist clerks, construction laborers, plumbers, pipefitters, maintenance and repair workers, sewing 
machine operators, textile operators and tenders, and computer operators. 
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formal agreements with private manufacturing firms that guarantee paid, on-the-job training for 
each beneficiary. This program design requires a strong match between the content of the 
training courses and the firm’s labor skill requirements and thus a strict coordination between the 
training institutions and the manufacturing firms in designing and implementing the training 
courses. As a result, the coverage of this training program is limited because of its costly design 
and relatively intense package of services. 
If the firms receive unproductive workers, they are entitled by law to drop their labor 
contracts at any time. Responsibility for the completion of both phases of training falls solely on 
the training institutions. A system of conditional payments based on the training centers’ 
effectiveness in successfully completing the six-month course provides incentives to train only 
for those individuals in occupations with assured labor demand.11  
5.2  Data and Treatment Impacts   
From 1996 to 2003, the period for which there is data, the PROJOVEN evaluation datasets 
consist of 10 different subsamples associated with five different cohorts of beneficiaries 
receiving treatment in Lima, and five corresponding comparison group samples. The beneficiary 
subsamples are selected from a stratified random sample of the population of participants 
corresponding to the first, second, fourth, sixth, and eighth rounds of the programs.12 Individuals 
in the corresponding comparison subsamples are selected from a random sample of “nearest-
neighbor” households located in the same neighborhood as those participants included in the 
evaluation sample. The program operator builds the comparison samples by using the same 
eligibility instruments applied to the treatment sample and by pairing each beneficiary to a 
random neighbor who has the same sex, age, schooling, labor market status, and poverty status. 
The neighborhood dimension may have the ability to control for some unobservables, including 
geographic segregation, transportation costs, and firms’ location, which may affect the 
propensity to work and the potential outcomes.   
For each treated and untreated cohort combination, we have panel data collected in four 
rounds, including a baseline survey and three follow-up surveys taken 6, 12, and 18 months after 
                                                          
11 Payments are structured in per capita terms according to the following scheme: 100, 80, 60, and 30 percent if 
completing both phases of the program, at least one month of on-the-job training, only formal training, and at least a 
month of formal training, respectively.  
12 The total number of participants in these program rounds is 1507, 1812, 2274, 2583, and 3114, respectively. The 
corresponding number of treated individuals in the random sample is 299, 321, 343, 405, and 421. 
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the program. The baseline survey provides rich information for all variables that define the 
eligibility status. It also contains demographics and labor-market information. In fact, relevant 
factors affecting both the propensity to participate in the program and labor market outcomes are 
available. There is information, for example, on education attainment, marital status, number of 
children, parents’ schooling, and participation in welfare programs. The labor-market module 
includes information about labor force participation, experience, monthly earnings, working 
hours, occupation, firm’s size, and participation in previous training courses. At the household 
level, there is information about family size, family income, and household’s density rate. In 
addition, the datasets provide detailed information on dwelling characteristics, including source 
of drinking water, toilet facilities, and house infrastructure (type of materials used in the floor, 
ceiling, and walls), which can be used to measure the poverty status. Moreover, the follow-up 
surveys provide detailed labor-market information for both treated and comparison groups, using 
the same definitions and variables as the baseline instruments, which minimize potential biases 
due to misalignment in the measurement of variables.   
The baseline datasets show the program participants to be a homogenous population in 
terms of several socioeconomic and labor-market characteristics including sex, age, schooling, 
parents’ education, type of work, previous training, and family size. On the other hand, the data 
also reveal some significant differences in variables such as marital status, presence of children, 
monthly earnings, family income, and some dwelling characteristics, which would play an 
important role in any econometric strategy intended to eliminate selection bias.   
The outcomes of interest are employment and the quality of the employment. We use five 
proxies for quality of employment: size of the firm, health benefits, accident insurance, social 
security, and formal labor contracts. We implement local polynomial matching methods 
(Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997) to estimate the counterfactual outcome for program 
participants by taking weighted averages over the outcomes of observationally similar untreated 
individuals. We proceed under the assumption that the distribution of unobservables varies 
across treatment and comparison groups but not over time within groups, which is the standard 
assumption of difference-in-differences models.  
Four patterns emerge in Table 5. First, PROJOVEN’s overall effect on employment is 
positive but small (5 percent). This positive number is driven by females’ outcomes, which show 
large treatment impacts (10 percentage points). On the other hand, males’ outcomes show no 
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impact on employment. Second, there are strong and significant impacts on all employment-
quality variables for both males and females. Thus, PROJOVEN strongly affects the likelihood 
of obtaining high-quality jobs rather than mere labor force participation. This result is important 
because it clearly illustrates the link between productivity and informality and shows that active 
labor-market policies can reduce labor-market informality. Third, PROJOVEN’s impacts on job 
quality are not steady over time. Short-run treatment impacts are larger than medium-term 
impacts, calling into question the sustainability of the treatment impacts across time. Finally, it is 
important to note that general equilibrium effects on the Peruvian labor market are negligible 
given the limited coverage of this training program.  
6. Final Remarks 
The most distinctive characteristic of the Peruvian labor market is its high share of informal 
employment, which is above the average for Latin America. By 2000, 60 percent of the labor 
force worked at the margin of labor-market legislation. Contrary to what one would expect, the 
rate of informality increased steadily during the 1990s despite the fact that the benefits of 
formality and the costs of informality increased as a result of the deregulation of the labor 
markets, a healthy macroeconomic recovery, and tighter tax codes and regulation. 
A cross-sectional analysis of the data indicates there is a familiar face to informality: 
most informal workers are young, female, and unskilled. A time-series analysis, however, 
reveals that the growth in the share of informal employment was steeper for males, prime-age, 
and older workers, as well as for individuals with post-school non-university education. Overall, 
these patterns correspond to changes in the orientation of the economy along with technological 
changes as a consequence of the reduction of the relative price of capital due to the opening of 
the economy, which increased the relative demand of younger workers. Many older workers, 
who lost their jobs as a consequence of public downsizing, privatization, and the contraction of 
formerly protected manufacturing industries, were unable to find formal jobs.     
Two factors can explain the variation in the informality rates in the 1990s. First, Peru 
experienced a steady increase in the employment allocation in traditionally “informal” sectors. In 
particular, retail trade and transport, which together account for about 55 percent of the overall 
informality rate in 2000, increased their share in total employment by 10 percent between 1990 
and 2000. Second, there was a sharp increase in non-wage labor costs—despite a reduction in the 
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average productivity of the economy. A firm would be willing to incur these costs if it is able to 
transfer at least part of them to its workers in the form of lower salaries, or if it perceives that 
providing the benefits will increase productivity. Similarly, workers will accept lower current 
earnings if they value the benefits that they receive more than the cost they pay to cover them. 
Therefore, it is not strange that several small firms choose to have informal employment 
relationships, both because their productivity is too low to be able to finance the mandated 
benefits and also because their workers are not willing to receive lower salaries to cover these 
costs.  
We illustrate the negative correlation between productivity and informality by evaluating 
the impacts of the Young Training PROJOVEN program, which offers training to disadvantaged 
young individuals aged 16 to 24 through job-specific training in blue-collar occupations. We find 
significant impacts on all employment-quality variables for both males and females. In fact, the 
PROJOVEN study shows that increments in individuals’ productivity lead to lower levels of 
informality rates among the treated population. 
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Figure 1. Informal Employment in Latin America 
(in percent) 
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Figure 2. Informal Employment, 1986-2001  
(% of total employment) 
 
Source: National Household Survey: 1986, 1987, 1989-1995, 1997-2001. Includes Metropolitan Lima only. 
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Figure 3. Informality by Gender: 1986-2001 
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Source: National Household Survey: 1986, 1987, 1989-1995, 1997-2001. Includes Metropolitan Lima only. 
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Figure 4. Informality by Age: 1986-2001 
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Figure 5. Informality by Schooling Attainment: 1986-2001 
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Figure 6. Non-Wage Labor Costs: 1986-2001 
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Table 1. Informal Sector Employment by Geographic Region and Income Bracket 
 
Geographic region
Middle East & North Africa 60.65 5.02 2
Sub-Saharan Africa 53.30 13.33 12
Latin America & Caribbean 51.39 5.86 7
South Asia 47.23 14.61 3
East Europe & Central Asia 43.59 14.12 9
East Asia & Pacific 25.35 11.20 4
OECD 17.10 10.48 9
Income Bracket
High income 18.49 10.82 10
Upper middle income 53.07 15.37 3
Lower middle income 47.39 12.93 14
Low income 47.49 15.86 19
Total 41.52 18.31 46.00
Mean informal 
employment
Std. Dev. 
informal employment
Observations
 
Notes: Informal-sector employment is reported as the share of the labor force in the unofficial economy in the 
capital city of each country as a percentage of the total employment. Income brackets are defined following the 
World Bank’s classification. A detailed list of countries in each category is included in Appendix 1. 
Source: Botero et al. (2002). 
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Table 2. Employment Shares across Economic Sectors: 1986-2001 
(in percent) 
 
 Manufacture Public  Adm. Construction Trade Transportation Finance 
       
1986 23.29 6.31 5.55 28.09 6.89 4.59 
1987 22.03 6.64 5.87 29.84 6.46 4.79 
1989 19.90 6.65 4.80 31.49 6.38 5.60 
1990 21.16 6.65 5.00 31.21 5.75 5.02 
1991 19.04 6.42 4.69 32.66 6.43 5.76 
1992 17.26 5.35 5.71 33.80 6.97 6.07 
1993 17.86 5.80 5.69 36.31 7.78 7.14 
1994 19.21 5.21 6.19 35.40 7.43 8.68 
1995 19.69 4.59 5.17 34.11 7.46 9.00 
1996 16.74 4.11 6.62 32.85 9.49 9.53 
1997 15.06 4.77 5.43 35.74 9.74 8.47 
1999 14.47 5.51 5.84 32.62 9.84 9.47 
2000 16.04 5.19 4.30 34.78 9.82 9.40 
2001 14.19 4.63 4.81 35.28 9.90 6.83 
 
Source: National Household Survey: 1986, 1987, 1989-1995, 1997-2001. Includes Metropolitan Lima only. 
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Table 3. Decomposing the Informality Rates in Between and Within Changes 
(using “legal” definition) 
 
1995-1987
between within total
primary activities -0.03 0.30 0.27
manufacturing -1.24 1.16 -0.09
public administration -0.01 0.03 0.02
construction -0.45 0.32 -0.13
trade, restaurant, and hotels 3.01 -1.43 1.58
transport and communications 0.67 1.68 2.35
finance, insurance, and business 1.45 0.79 2.24
other services -2.05 -1.24 -3.29
Total 1.33 1.61 2.95
1995-1989
between within total
primary activities -0.42 0.02 -0.40
manufacturing -0.11 0.95 0.84
public administration -0.01 0.01 -0.01
construction 0.24 0.64 0.88
trade, restaurant, and hotels 1.85 -0.79 1.06
transport and communications 0.72 1.18 1.90
finance, insurance, and business 1.17 0.36 1.53
other services -2.11 -0.48 -2.59
Total 1.33 1.88 3.21
2000-1987
between within total
primary activities -0.16 -0.03 -0.19
manufacturing -3.88 2.82 -1.07
public administration -0.05 0.17 0.13
construction -1.11 0.53 -0.58
trade, restaurant, and hotels 3.84 1.07 4.92
transport and communications 2.45 2.81 5.26
finance, insurance, and business 1.32 0.28 1.61
other services -1.84 0.06 -1.78
Total 0.57 7.72 8.28
2000-1989
between within total
primary activities -0.37 -0.23 -0.60
manufacturing -2.50 2.64 0.14
public administration -0.05 0.15 0.10
construction -0.35 0.80 0.45
trade, restaurant, and hotels 2.56 1.73 4.28
transport and communications 2.51 2.14 4.65
finance, insurance, and business 1.09 -0.16 0.93
other services -1.90 0.85 -1.05
Total 0.97 7.93 8.90
Source: National Household Survey: 1986, 1987, 1989-1995, 1997-2001.
Includes Metropolitan Lima only.
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Legal Traditional Legal Traditional Legal Traditional 
Age -0.029* -0.017** -0.007** -0.005** -0.009** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Age squared 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.013 -0.049** 0.001 -0.076** 0.001 -0.070**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Married 0.036** 0.054** -0.069** 0.052** -0.060** 0.052**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Married male -0.074** -0.093** 0.037** -0.077** 0.028** -0.080**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
No schooling 0.296** 0.242** 0.241** 0.240** 0.245** 0.228**
(0.028) (0.038) (0.022) (0.029) (0.020) (0.026)
Primary 0.189** 0.209** 0.137** 0.145** 0.138** 0.151**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Tertiary educ (non university) -0.254** -0.267** -0.244** -0.216** -0.247** -0.226**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Tertiary educ (university) -0.198** -0.193** -0.283** -0.229** -0.272** -0.226**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Tenure -0.021** -0.009** -0.015** -0.007** -0.016** -0.008**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tenure squared 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
On the job training -0.135** -0.160** -0.275** -0.269** -0.244** -0.225**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017)
Training  (IST, CEO) -0.042** -0.011** -0.076** -0.048** -0.081** -0.051**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Agriculture/Mining -0.023 -0.013 0.025 -0.004 0.026 0.000
(0.040) (0.041) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029)
Public Sector -0.570** -0.531** -0.580** -0.582** -0.578** -0.579**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011)
Construction 0.105** 0.227** 0.124** 0.194** 0.133** 0.204**
(0.022) (0.019) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Retail Trade, Hotels, and 0.253** 0.405** 0.206** 0.373** 0.214** 0.380**
(0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Transportation and Communications 0.034 0.095** 0.157** 0.282** 0.150** 0.266**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Finance -0.088** -0.016 -0.139** 0.046** -0.130** 0.039**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Other Services 0.056** 0.190** 0.003 0.130** 0.013 0.141**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Non-wage Labor Cost (firms) 0.003** 0.006**
(0.001) (0.001)
Non-wage Labor Cost (workers) -0.001 0.001**
(0.010) (0.001)
N 12894 12894 25942 25942 32077 32077
**significant at the 5-percent level,*significant at the 10-percent level
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 4 Probit Marginal Effects for Informal/Formal Employment  
National Household Survey, Lima 1986-2001
1986-1991 Pooled Sample1991-2001
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Table 5. Impacts of PROJOVEN on Quality of Employment, 
Lima 1996-2003 
 
 6 months after   
program 
 12 months after 
program 
 Male Female  Male Female 
      
Employment 0.001 
(0.045) 
0.082 
(0.066) 
 -0.035 
(0.043) 
0.086 
(0.063) 
      
Quality of Employment      
     
         Labor contract 0.134** 
(0.026) 
0.188** 
(0.017) 
 0.126** 
(0.049) 
0.132** 
(0.015) 
      
         Firm’s size >100 0.109** 
(0.015) 
0.176** 
(0.017) 
 0.109** 
(0.015) 
0.176** 
(0.016) 
      
         Health insurance 0.089** 
(0.015) 
0.095** 
(0.014) 
 0.070** 
(0.017) 
0.112** 
(0.015) 
      
      Accident insurance 0.135** 
(0.016) 
0.122** 
(0.016) 
 0.094** 
(0.017) 
0.111** 
(0.018) 
      
       Social security 0.083** 
(0.015) 
0.078** 
(0.014) 
 0.057** 
(0.015) 
0.098** 
(0.014) 
      
                          **Significant at 5 percent. 
 
 
